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NOTES
A SITUATION IN WHICH THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ENFORCE THE
WIFE'S STATUTORY DOWER RIGHT
There is no dispute that a voluntary transfer of realty by a husband is sub-
ject to the dower or statutory interests of the wife therein.1 This is a vested right
in the wife at coverture and death has no effect on it except to convert an equitable
into a legal title. As to personalty, the antithetical rule is that the husband has
an absolute right to dispose of it as he desires, with or without his wife's consent.
However, at the husband's death, the "expectant" right of the wife in the person-
alty is converted into a vested right for she then shares in the remaining personalty
in shares according as the law provides.
2
Pennsylvania courts have often been presented with the perplexing question
as to whether item X is personalty or realty. In most cases, a clear-cut answer
can be given, but in some cases item X may be either personalty or realty and in
a few cases.it may be both.
The question the writer is concerned with here is a specific instance of the
"conversion" of realty into personalty by the act of the donor. A subsequent
question which is posed is the wife's rights when this situation occurs.
Preliminarily, it must be pointed out that the Pennsylvania legislature8 has
time and again given expression to the strong public policy that a wife ought not
to be left destitute when her husband dies, if her husband in fact had anything
of pecuniary value in which she could share. Thus, where a husband by will dis-
poses of all this property, real, personal, and mixed, and does not include his
"beloved" wife as a beneficiary, the law provides she may elect to take against the
will.' Other elementary rules of testamentary disposition and death intestate
illustrate the same policy.
To tie together all the elements of the problem involved, a hypothetical
question composed of fact situations from various cases, seems to be most practical
and will, therefore, be presented.
The Problem
H and W marry. Two children are born of the marriage. Sometime during
the marriage there are difficulties-a separation, unsuccessful divorce action,
etc. The husband becomes incensed and determines to "cut off" W from as
much as he possibly can. Upon consulting counsel, he learns that his wife has
a vested interest in his realty, but no interest in personalty while he is living. H
disposes of all his personalty but is seised of a home worth $5,000. H makes
out his will leaving to W "just what she is entitled to under the law and no more."
1 64 A. L. R. 480.
2 J. P. Lines v. W. E. Lines, et. al., 142 Pa. 149, 21 A. 809 (1891).
2 Intestate Act. of 1947; Wills Act of 1947.
4 Wills Act of 1947.
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Then H makes out an ordinary judgment note in favor of his two sons in the
bum of $5,000, "not to be exercised until after my death." H delivers the note
in escrow to attorney X. H dies.
The Will
A careful study of the Potter Title and Trast Co.5 case leaves no doubt that
the wording of the bequest to W in H's will is entirely legal. It is neither fraud
in itself nor is it evidence of fraud. The court does not even consider the question
worth a discussion. Although this identical language is seldom used, it appears
to be a graceful way to deny to the wife anything unless her forefathers enacted
legislation for her protection.
Of course, under the provisions of the Intestate Act, W may choose to take
against H's will.6 Her share then is one-third. No personalty having remained, W
must secure her share out of the $5,000 home. When she takes legal action to sell
the home, however, the children present H's note and levy execution on the
home. Whose claim is superior?
The Note
To attack the validity of the note, one may use several avenues of approach.
At first thought, it may be argued that the note is testamentary in character
and thus of no legal effect unless executed in accordance with the provisions
of the Wills Act.7 There is some authority to support this argument8 but H has
been very careful. He has executed what amounts to a present obligation, only
the payment or discharge of which is postponed until his death. This he has every
right to do. 9 The mere fact that payment is to be made after the maker's death
does not necessarily make the note testamentary in character. 10
Where is the consideration? True, neither of the children gave anything
of value in exchange for the note (and it may be added that the children need
not even know of the note's existence) and in most states this would amount
to a mere promise to pay, unenforceable for lack of consideration."1 However, in
Pennsylvania12 the "magic of the seal" arises to surmount this obstacle and again
H has been very careful to see that his note was under seal.
There has been a delivery of the note so as to make it irrevocable's and the
escrow delivery, of course, carries with it the legal fiction of "the doctrine of
relating back." 14 This reenforces the proposition that the note is a binding obliga-
tion.
5 294 Pa. 482, 144 A. 401 (1928).
6 Intestate Act of 1947, Sec. 2.
7 64 A. L. R. 480.
8 Geisinger's Will, 5 D. & C. 493 (Pa. 1924).
9 68 C. J. 619.
10 Eisenlohr's Estate (No. 2), 258 Pa. 438, 102 A. 117 (1917); Unif. N. I. L. Ann. 66 (a).
11 BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, pp. 167.
12 Mack & Person's Appeal, 68 Pa. 231 (1871).
1a In re Bell's Will, 161 Pa. Super. 3, 54 A.2d 79 (1947).
14 9 PrmrBuRra L. Rav. (1947).
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Finally, the hypothetical question was drawn in part from In re Rynier's
Estate15 and a close study of that case indicates that H's method has been both
thorough and effective. One will note, however, that in the Rynier case the
wife died and by various judgment notes prevented her husband from sharing
in her estate. If one could ignore prior and later cases, this point might bear con-
siderable weight. However, other cases which involve a similar question show
that it was the husband who died and the conclusion must be that the sex of the
decedent is immaterial.
Preliminary Conclusions
Thus far, we have established that H has created a will and a note, both
complete, and both blessed by the Pennsylvania courts. Yet there is something
about the whole maneuver that is obnoxious and contrary to the existing public
policy that a husband ought not to be permitted to leave his wife penniless
when in fact others will share what he has. After the Rynier case, two scathing
law review articles 1'6 appeared attacking the situation but all the writers could
use to support their argument was their own opinion since the cases ruled other-
wise.
These articles did point up, however, that whether the cases agree or not,
this is fraud. It might be well to consider then this element of fraud.
Fraud
Pennsylvania courts (and all others, for that matter) abhor fraud.17 The
court reports have many cases where a wife has successfully challenged her hus-
band's conveyance of realty or gift of personalty made during coverture because
it was fradulent. The courts are careful, however, to point out that it is "actual
fraud" which must be shown.
What is "actual" fraud? Definitions will fall aglore if one uses the law
dictionaries. But these definitions are of no help unless they are adopted by
the courts. Pennsylvania courts seem to be somewhat in a dither as to what they
will regard as actual fraud, as witness the following contradictory statements:
"The law will lay its hands upon a fraudulent scheme to deprive the
wife of her dower." 18
"It is not fraudulent as to the wife or children even though the intent
and effect are to defeat their succession to the property." 1' 9
The latter is the majority view of the law2' and the one most often adopted
by Pennsylvania. But does this answer the original question, "What is actual
15 347 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943).
16 18 T. L. Q. 185.
17 Commonwealth v. Adams, 97 Pa. Super. 510 (1929).
18 Waterhouse v. Waterhouse. 206 Pa. 433, 55 A. 1067 (1903).
19 Fritz' Estates, 135 Pa. Super. 463, 5 A.2d 601 (1939).
10 64 A. L. R. 487.
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fraud?" All that has been decided is what actual fraud is not. In the only af-
firmative approaches to the question the courts have taken, a colorable or sham
transfer has been involved. 2 1 This is the situation where the husband does not
divest himself of title absolutely. It is submitted that this is not a fraudulent
transfer but no transfer at all!
The only logical answer that can be given to the question of actual fraud
then, is that the courts are insisting upon something they have not yet defined. As
unjust as this may appear, the fact remains that for the purposes of this article,
fraud appears not to be available as an attack on the hypothetical situation.
The Dissent
One lone Pennsylvania case, 22 never directly overruled, but no longer the
law by implication, stands for what the writer believes to be a more satisfactory,
statement of the law. In that case the husband executed several promissory notes
to his children, payable after his death. While the court admitted that the husband
"may give away or squander his property and thus reduce himself and his wife
to poverty," it went on to add, "but no case has gone so far as to sustain a
voluntary obligation given and received with intent to defraud the wife's rights."
The case has lost most of its value, however, because the principal holding was
that the fraud will not stand where the donee is a party to it.
In unusual language, Justice Sterrett terms the widow's position as that of a
purchaser, giving her a "higher equity" which gives her a right to compensation out
of the estate. In other words, the court feels that while the husband has an ab-
solute right to give away his personal property, a superior right exists in the
wife when such rights of the husband are abused.
A small minority of other states in the U. S. have also held that an intention
to deprive the wife of her share in an estate is a fraudulent intent.28 New Hamp-
shire2 4 and Ohio2 5 have so held. Kentucky26 takes perhaps the most reasonable
view by declaring that the intent to deprive the wife of her rights may be fraudulent
if from the condition of the parties to the transaction and all the surrounding
circumstances it appears to the court that a fraudulent intent was in fact present.
Recent Cases
The device is apparently still in use and an examination of recent cases is
therefore important. In Patton v. Patton27 only the disposal of personal property
is involved but the case is important for its discussion of fraudulent intent. Again
the court insists upon a showing of actual fraud. It is surprising, however, to
21 See Note 2.
22 Hummel's Estate, Hummel's Appeal, 161 Pa. 217 (1894).
28 64 A. L. R. 492.
24 Walker v. Walker, 66 N. Hamp. 390, 31 A. 14 (1890).
25 Doyle v. Doyle, 50 Ohio St. 330, 30 N. E. 166 (1893).
26 Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky, 1, 13 S. W. 244 (1890).
27 Patton v. Patton, 351 Pa. 6, 39 A.2d 921 (1944).
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note that the Hummel2 8 case is cited to support this proposition. As has been
shown, the Hummel case seems to be singular in assuming just the contrary
position. By dicta the court adds that "mere conjecture or suspicion is insufficient"
-which again explains what actual fraud is not!
A most surprising case appeared in the late reports and because of its
recent character and its interesting decision, it will be discussed in detail. ThL
case in point is Cancilla v. Bondy.29
Tony Cancilla married the plaintiff, she being his second wife. He owned
property valued at $7500. Four months after the marriage, Cancilla gave a
$10,000 mortgage bond to his grandson and then executed a mortgage in his
favor also. Later, Cancilla gave the same grandson a $3,000 mortgage on the
same property. No consideration passed between the grandson and Cancilla.
When Cancilla died, his sole survivors were the grandson and the plaintiff.
By his will, he left the property to his grandson and the residue of his estate
to his wife, but at the time of his death he owned nothing except the mortgaged
premises!
The principal question with which the case deals is the wife's rights against
a purchasor from the mortgagee. To determine these rights, however, the court
must preliminarily determine whether the husband has made a bona fide gift
to the grandson.
The court notes that the Hummel"° case decided that,
"Even in the case of his personal property, he (the husband) cannot
make a fraudulent gift of it in contemplation of death or to take effect
upon death and thereby defraud his wife's statutory rights as his widow."
Then follows what could be an important change in existing law-
"The execution of the mortgages by Cancilla to Lenia (the grandson)
was apatently crude attempt to destroy the plaintiff's dower rights in the
property and was a poor subterfuge for a will which could not have
been effectual for the purpose. The mortgages were th'erefore voidable
as to her (italics added).
Would thL Candilla case then, answer the hypothetical problem? A compari-
son discloses the following points:
1. The personalty in the Cancilla case was a mortgage. The personalty in
the hypothetical problem (and Rynier case) was a note.
2. There are no words of limitation on what the wife shall eceive in the
Cancilla will, but in the hypothetical problem the language clearly illus-
trates the wife is to get as little as possible.
28 See note 22.
29 353 Pa. 249, 44 A.2d 587 (1945).
80 See note 22.
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3. In the Cancilla case there was no actual consideration, nor was there
any in the hypothetical question.
4. In neither case was a colorable or sham transfer involved.
It is quite probable that there is no material distinction to be drawn simply
because the personalty differs in kind.81 If anything, Cancilla was much more
considerate of his wife in his will than was hypothetical H, so that the second
distinction is eliminated.
It may be profitable to discuss again the element of consideration. It may
be assumed that the mortgage bond in the Cancilla case was under seal which
under Pennsylvania law takes the place of consideration. 2 But to that rule there
is one exception, probably two, and possibly three. The one express exception
is in the court of equity.83 The probable exception exists where fraud is shown
but it is to be noted that these cases are few and are roundly criticized.84 The possi-
ble exception is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in one case has considered
it expedient to dispense with the magic of the seal altogether in a law court.36
The reception this case was given, however, was not altogether heart-warming.a s
The Cancilla case was brought in equity and whether from that fact the court
found no consideration, or from the plaintiff's failure to plead it, is not definitely
declared.
The Cancilla case is important for it is a case where the court found "actual"
fraud where there was no colorable or sham transfer involved.
The question may be raised, however, as to what basis the court had for
its decision. Was it the "patently crude attempt" to defraud, as shown by all
the evidence, or was it the lack of consideration? If it was tht latter, then one is
redirected to the question of why the court found there was no consideration.
Later cases seem to stress that the idea of consideration was paramount. Thus
Justice Steame in Overbeck v. McHalea8 says of the Cancilla case,
"There the husband voluntarily mortgaged his property. The only
purpose was to defraud his wife."
Again in Moser v. Granquists the Court said,
"There was no allegation or testimony that the purchaser was a purchaser
for value from the husband or was acting in collusion with the husband
to defraud the defendant of her marital rights."
81 Although this may seem to be a superfluous statement, the writer is convinced that for purposes
of the seal as consideration in a bill in equity, some distinction may be drawn.
82 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 262 Pa. 540, 106 A. 198 (1919).
39 MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY. 2nd Ed. pp. 130.
84 Golder v. Bogash, 325 Pa. 449, 188 A. 837 (1937).
85 Commonwealth Trust Company General Mortgage Investment Fund Case, 357 Pa. 349, 54 A.2d.
649 (1947).
86 52 DICK. L. REv. 175; 23 T. L. Q. 147; 96 UNiv. OF PA. L. REv. 433.
837 354 Pa. 177, 47 A.2d 142 (1946).
28 362 Pa. 302, 66 A.2d 267 (1949).
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Conclusions
It is apparent that W's most likely chance for recovery in the hypothetical
question will lie in a bill in equity to protect her statutory dower rights on the
assumption that the court will find no consideration.
It is hoped that the reader is aware that actually this should be an elementary
question. Clearly a man who makes a gift to personalty which in fact is not
a gift of personalty but the transfer of an interest in realty is interfering thereby
with the statutory dower interests of his wife. This he is prohibited by law from
doing. This note endeavors to point out that what seems to be such an elementary
question has been clouded by judicial insistence on "actual fraud," by inadequate
discussions of what that term means, and by such legal magic as is performed
by the seal, that now the answer is not at all obvious.
John A. MacPhail
